Burundi: When and how would Burundi be equipped with a truly national army and police? (Fifth part)

Burundi: When and how would Burundi be equipped with a truly national army and police? (Fifth part)
Yesterday we were talking about the killings of 1993 that some call massacres, other genocide of Tutsis. Unlike the other massacres that took place in our country, a United Nations commission investigated the 1993 case and wrote a report S / 1996/682 of August 22, 1996 in which it states that the 1993 massacres of Tutsis are qualified as genocide of the Tutsis by the Hutus of Frodebu. Unfortunately, the criminals have not been punished; a few people were jailed, but, as in the case of the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye, the planners were not punished, they are not worried until today. It is the culture of impunity that has kept Burundi in endless cycles of violence.
Among those who planned and carried out this genocide of the Tutsis, some remained in the country, others who were afraid have gone into exile in Rwanda, Tanzania, DR Congo and other countries. They returned with the nascent rebellion in 1994 to fight within the FDD (forces for the defence of democracy). Those in Rwanda are said to have even given a hand to the interhamwe in the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsis in 1994 and returned to Burundi after the action. Rwandans are still looking for them.
The Burundian armed forces made a lot of recruitments to have enough to fight the rebellion which only killed the Tutsi survivors of the 1993 genocide, instead of attacking the military positions. They increased attacks on innocent defenceless civilians, IDP camps, schools, and ambushed on the routes, just to show that the government was unable to protect its people.
After the death of Melchior Ndadaye, Cyprien Ntaryamira who succeeded him, then Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, no government has succeeded in quickly mastering this nascent rebellion since all these presidents did not trust their army and the war began was ethnic; Anyone who said that President Ntibantunganya was an accomplice of the Hutus who were in the bush would not be mistaken. Despite all this, the national army stood firm; the rebellion never conquered any square meter of territory, never succeeded in attacking and dislodging a military camp, not even a police brigade (which did not have more than 30 people). All this thanks to the professionalism of this army, a united, homogeneous, disciplined, hierarchical army, whose command was assured by trained officers, able to quickly take good decisions according to the circumstances.
As for the troops, a lot of recruiting was done; some training was done in haste because they needed a lot of men to deploy on the ground as the rebellion was killing in many localities of the country. Many Hutus were then recruited into this army, even if others joined the various rebellions (the best known were the cnddfdd and the fnl).
With the signing of the Arusha accords, the various rebel factions agreed to sign the ceasefire agreements one by one, the last being the fnl of Agathon Rwasa, two years after the cnddfdd which signed in November 2003. It was then necessary to integrate all these elements within the defence and security forces while respecting the quotas agreed in the Arusha accords. With regard to the principle of «  many men, many weapons, many places  » within the new force that was to be formed, the cnddfdd was considered to be the main movement which brought many men and in all categories. It should be noted that this movement has always cheated, even in the elections. Indeed, he found that he did not have enough able-bodied men to present and proceeded to recruit in the provinces of Muramvya, kayanza, Ngozi, Kirundo and Muyinga. These young people underwent accelerated training in the Kibira and were integrated into the new force. It should also be noted that even the old mothers who prepared food for the combatants were presented for demobilization to review program money.
In total, 07 PMPA (Armed Political Parties and Movements) participated in the integration-demobilization program; the cnddfdd having won the big part for presenting a lot of men and a lot of weapons. The big mistake made by Agathon Rwasa’s FNL is to delay in implementing the ceasefire agreements. That’s why he wasn’t able to reap many benefits from this program. But also, it received few places compared to the cnddfdd.
Another striking fact which is still the basis of a lot of conflicts between the cnddfdd and fnl is that the two movements have always clashed during their marquis because they often fought over the ground. Sometimes they bumped into each other and it was the Burundian armed forces that separated them by adding fire. It was the most effective strategy to separate them, to take the opportunity to weaken them all. This visceral hatred has remained to this day.
After the comprehensive ceasefire agreements, the former armed forces were too naive, believing that all the former armed groups were driven by good faith and a desire to build a country long torn by fratricidal war. Yet the cnddfdd seemed to have another hidden agenda. He had in Bururi, just after integration, an harmonization training between combatants from the cnddfdd and soldiers of the old army. The elements that were sent there were considered, according to the cnddfdd fighters, as guinea pigs, people abandoned because they believed they were going to die. First sign of lack of confidence. He also told himself that this movement had left combatants in the DRCongo (kiliba ondes), just to intervene if the integration got out of hand. A sign of caution some would say.
During 2004, the new defence and security forces were made up of a heterogeneous mix of men and women from all walks of life, some trained and others unable to read or write. Within the framework of respecting the Arusha agreements, some members of the ex-PMAP saw themselves being propelled into chiefs without knowing what to do, some could not even read and write French; people who were promoted for their exceptional merits in combat. Another very important screw to underline is that the Hutus who were in the old army were not considered, by the Hutus resulting from the ex pmpa as Hutus like them; they assimilated them to Tutsis, the others took them as traitors. Yet the arusha accords spoke of ethnic balances. Note also, and this is very important, that almost zero Tutsi were part of these PMPAs and there was never, after the war, any exchange of prisoners of war. Which is abnormal and which means that the war was very dirty, waged in flagrant violation of International Humanitarian Law and the law of war. Some fnl prisoners detained at the National Documentation were released and handed over to the movement, the fnl in turn released, in the presence of the ICRC, a few civilians held in the rukoko.
URN HITAMWONEZA finds that the fight waged by the PMPAs was total and ethnic; the privileged targets were the Tutsis. Even those who joined or attempted to join the groups were killed. This sufficiently demonstrates that the genocide project has never left the minds of Hutu extremists despite the Arusha accords.
We will show tomorrow how the cnddfdd progressively violated the Arusha accords by upsetting the balance within the defence and security corps; we will show you their current composition and functioning.

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